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REA v. UNITED STATES-OLD PROBLEMS IN
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BY JOHN J. CONWAY
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University, honor graduate of Re-
gis College, Denver. Currently a
senior in the Denver University Col-
lege of Law and expects to receive
the LL. B. in December, 1956. An
Air Force veteran, Conway is an
associate editor of Dicta and a
deputy clerk in the Superior Court.
In Rea v. United States,' petitioner was originally indicted in a
federal court for the unlawful acquisition of marihuana in violation
of a federal law. The indictment was based on evidence obtained
by a search warrant issued to a federal officer by a United States
Commissioner.
Rea moved under Rule 41 (e) of the Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure, 2 to suppress the evidence on the ground that the search war-
rant was improperly issued. The District Court granted the motion
and dismissed the indictment, although the evidence remained in
the possession of the federal officer.
After the suppression of the evidence, the officer swore to a
complaint before a New Mexico judge and caused a warrant for
Rea's arrest to issue. He was charged with being in possession of
marihuana in violation of state law.
Rea then moved in the District Court to enjoin the federal
agent from testifying in the state case.
It was conceded that the case against Rea in the state court
would be made by testimony of the federal agent based on the
illegal search and on the evidence seized under the illegal federal
warrant.
Relief was denied on the ground that the suppression of evi-
dence in a federal court under Rule 41 and the Fourth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States applied only to proceedings
in federal courts and did not govern the use of that evidence in a
state court. Rea appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit.
176 S. Ct. 292, 350 U. S. 214, (1956).
2 18 U. S. C. A.
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The action denying relief was affirmed, Judge Huxman pointing
out:
The prohibition against the use of ((illegally seized)
evidence is limited to trials in the federal courts and there
only when it was unlawfully obtained by federal officers
or agents. It has consistently been held that . . . evidence
unlawfully obtained by federal officers may be used in state
trials ... 3
Referring to Stefanelli v. Minard,4 in which a state officer
sought to use evidence obtained in violation of the Federal Civil
Rights Act in a state proceeding, Judge Huxman alluded to the
"delicate balance between state and federal judicial systems" and
affirmed the principle adopted in the Stefanelli case, that "federal
courts should refuse to intervene in state criminal proceedings to
suppress the use of evidence even when claimed to have been se-
cured by unlawful search and seizure."
Implying a recognition of the Tenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution, 5 he concluded that the effect of allowing the injunc-
tion would make impossible the prosecution by the state of its
action against Rea, and that "such an order would constitute an in-
terference with the state judicial process."
Rea obtained certiorari, and Mr. Justice Douglas, for the ma-
jority (Douglas, Black, Frankfurter, Clark, and Warren) of the
United States Supreme Court put all constitutional question to one
side. Rather, he concluded, was this a case "concerning our super-
visory powers over federal law enforcement agencies."
He added that "we have here no problem concerning the in-
terplay of the Fourth and the Fourteenth Amendments nor the use
which New Mexico might make of the evidence."
In thus limiting what he perceived to be the issue, Justice
Douglas ruled:
The power of the federal courts extends to policing
those requirements (governing searches and seizures) and
making certain they are observed... To enjoin the federal
agent from testifying is merely to enforce the federal Rules
against those owing obedience to them .... The obligation
of the federal agent is to obey the Rules.
On these bases the decision refusing the injunction was re-
versed.
Mr. Justice Harlan, for the dissenting four justices (Harlan,
Reed, Burton, and Minton), argued that the majority view departed
from the concepts which had theretofore governed state and federal
relationships regarding the problem of admissibility of illegally
seized evidence.
The majority decision was also questioned insofar as it held that
the "policing" of federal laws was a duty imposed upon the Court.
Said the dissent, "this is the first time it has been suggested that
" Rea v. United States, 218 F. 2d 237 (10th Cir. 1954).
472 S. Ct. 118, 342 U. S. 117, 96 L. Ed. 138 (1951).
5 "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
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the federal courts share with the executive branch... responsibility
for supervising law enforcement activities as such."
While recognizing that the federal courts "undeniably have the
power to issue an injunction in a case such as this," the dissent con-
cluded that the power should not be exercised in the factual situa-
tiontion presented in the Rea case. Drawing attention to the Stef-
anelli case and the delicate balance there referred to, Justice Harlan
pointed out that the injunction would stultify the state prosecution
as effectively as if it had been issued directly against the state or
its officials.
The dissent then considered the evidentiary problem. Calling
attention to the Wolf case6 and the Weeks case 7, Justice Harlan con-
cluded that" . . . this Court has hitherto taken the view that the
states should be left free to follow or not the federal exclusionary
rule . . . The present decision . . . (is) a step in the opposite and
wrong direction."
COMMENT
The path of the instant case, and the various theories adopted
by the courts in which it was argued have been set forth above in
some detail in order to illustrate the problems presented. Also, the
case gives rise to many implications which are worthy of considera-
tion.
EVnhENTIARY PROBLEM
Until about 70 years ago, the fact that evidence was obtained
by an illegal search was no objection to its admissibility, and that
is still the rule in a slight majority of the states.8 However, in
Boyd v. United States,9 the Federal Supreme Court ruled that cer-
tain documents unlawfully obtained from the accused by a federal
officer were not admissable in evidence in a federal court as a con-
sequence of the Fourth Amendment.
The Boyd ruling remained unquestioned in the federal courts
for eighteen years, but received frequent disfavor in the state courts.
Colorado, for example, despite the provisions in the State Consti-
tution securing freedom "from unreasonable search and seizure",10
approved the common-law doctrine of admissibility, indicating that
a sufficient remedy existed in favor of the one against whom the
illegal search had been made, viz., an action for trespass."
Then, in Adams v. New York," in 1904, the exclusionary doc-
trine was virtually repudiated in the United States Supreme Court,
and the orthodox rule of admissibility adopted by a majority of the
state courts was expressly approved.
Next, in 1914, in the Weeks case, the Supreme Court, motivated
by what Professor Wigmore has termed "misplaced sentimen-
tality,' 3 swung back to the doctrine of the Boyd case, but with a
condition, viz., that timely motion for the return of the articles
6 Wolf v. Colorado, 117 C. 279, 187 P. 2d, 926; 69 S. Ct. 1359, 338 U. S. 25 (1949).
7 Weeks v. United States, 34 S. Ct. 341, 232 U. S. 383, 58 L. Ed. 652 (1914).
8 McCormick on Evidence 291, (1954).
9 116 U. S. 616, 6 S Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746 (1886).
10 Colo. Const. Art. I, S. 7.
21 Roberts v. The People, 78 C. 555, 243 P. 544 (1926).
12 24 S. Ct. 372, 192 U. S. 597, 48 L. Ed. 575 (1904).
188 Wigmore on Evidence, § 2184 (Third Ed. 1940).
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seized be made prior to trial. Since 1914 the federal courts have
adhered to the exclusionary rule.
Justice Cardozo, later to become a leading figure on the Su-
preme Court, while a member of the New York bench described the
effect of the Weeks doctrine in this manner: "The criminal is to
go free because the constable has blundered."'14
The Supreme Court has had many opportunities to re-examine
its oft-criticized Weeks doctrine in recent years.
In the Wolf case, the Court refused to extend the doctrine to
evidence seized by a state officer and used to obtain a conviction in
a state court, although such evidence would have been inadmissible
in a federal court if seized by a federal officer on the basis of the
Fourth Amendment.
In Irvine v. People of State of California,1 5 the same result was
reached, the Court holding firm to the position that the admiss-
ibility of illegally obtained evidence by a state court in trial of a
state offense did not violate the "due process of law" required by
the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Rochin v. People of California,'6 however, the Court indi-
cated that the rule recognizing admissibility in a state court of evi-
dence seized unlawfully had certain limitations. Thus, where it
appeared that state officers used a stomach pump on an accused
person to obtain evidence which was later used in the state prosecu-
41 People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 413, 150 N. E. 585 (1926).
15 74 S. Ct. 381, 347 U. S. 128, 98 L. Ed. 561 (1954).
16 72 S. Ct. 205, 342 U. S. 165, 96 L. Ed. 183 (1952).
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tion, a judgment of conviction was reversed. The standard applied
was whether the actions of the officers would "shock the conscience
of the court." In the Rochin case, it was felt that the procedure did
just that.
The state of the law, prior to the Rea case may be summarized
in this fashion: (1) Generally, evidence illegally obtained by a
state officer is constitutionally admissible in a federal court on the
basis that "in the federal courts state officers are considered as
strangers," 17 and thus the Fourth Amendment does not run against
them. (2) Generally, evidence illegally obtained by a federal of-
ficer is constitutionally admissible against one prosecuted in a state
court. 8 (3) Generally, evidence illegally obtained by a state officer
is constitutionally admissible against one prosecuted in a state
court.19 (4) Generally, evidence illegally obtained by a federal of-
ficer is constitutionally inadmissible in a federal court prosecution,
since "the effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the courts of
the United States and Federal officials ... under limitations and re-
straints . .
Examining the Rea case in the light of the above decisions, the
conclusion is inevitable that the case is not, on its face, significant.
In its terms it is not directly analagous to either the Wolf or Irvine
cases, since federal officers were not involved in those cases. Nor
can it be said that the Stefanelli case comes within its terms, de-
spite the violation of the federal act in that case. While it may be
noteworthy that the majority in the Stefanelli case ruled that "the
federal courts should refuse to intervene in State criminal pro-
ceedings to suppress the use of evidence even when claimed to have
been secured by unlawful search and seizure," it is clear in the Rea
case that the facts are sufficiently different to account for the ap-
plication of a different standard. The rule in the SteJanelli case
should be restricted to the facts out of which it arose, namely, an
illegal search by state officers for use in a state court.
However, it is submitted that the case is indicative of a frame
of mind which someday will bring the Fourth Amendment within
the concept of "due process" under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In other words, the protection of "due process" against state action
will not be limited to "procedures which shock the conscience of the
court," but rather to all searches and seizures violative of an indivi-
dual's rights.
PROBLEM OF PUBLIC POLICY
The minority doctrine of exclusion, as set forth in the Weeks
case, has been criticized as an inexcusable obstruction of the ad-
ministration of justice, in that it aids only the guilty.
The problem appears to be principally one of interpretation,
either of the Fourth Amendment, of State constitutional provisions,
or of federal or state statutory enactments. It is a question of inter-
1720 Am Jur 358, Evidence s 397.
18 Terrano v. State, 59 Ney. 247, 91 P. 2d 67 (1939); contra, Edwards v. State, 83 Okla. Cr.
Ct. of Appeals 177, 177 P. 2d 143 (1947).
19 Stein v. New York, 73 S. Ct. 1077, 346 U. S. 156, 98 L. Ed. 362 (1953); Imboden Y. People,
40 C. 142, 90 P. 608 (1907).
-0 Weeks v. United States, 34 S. Ct. 341, 232 U. S. 383, 58 L. Ed. 652 (1914).
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pretation because the various provisos prohibit illegal searches and
seizures, but make no mention of the evidence problem.
The cases indicate, especially those in which opinions by Justice
Douglas have been written, that considerations of policy have
entered into the Court's deliberations.
Dissenting in the Stefanelli case, for example, Justice Douglas
referred to his dissent in the Wolf case, and affirmed his position
that "to hold that the evidence may be admitted and . . . that its
use may not be enjoined is to make the Fourth Amendment an
empty and hollow guarantee so far as state prosecutions are con-
cerned."
His language is strikingly similar to the language in the Weeks
case, namely that "the tendency of those who execute the criminal
laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful
seizures ... should find no sanction in the judgment of the courts."
Significant also, we think, is the language in Shinyu Noro v.
United States,2 1 that "it is a federal judicial policy not to allow
agents and officers of the United States to break the law themselves
and then use information so acquired to prosecute others."
Again, in Silverthrone Lumber Co. v. United States,22 the Su-
preme Court used like language in pointing out that the essence of
a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way
was not merely that the evidence so acquired should not be used
before the court, but that it should not be used at all.
Professor Wigmore, however, criticizes what he refers to as "the
indirect and unnatural method" resulting in exclusion, drawing the
following analogy: 23
Titus, you have been found guilty . . .; Flavius, you
have.., violated the constitution. Titus ought to suffer im-
prisonment for crime, and Flavius for contempt. But no!
We shall let you both go free. We shall not punish Flavius
directly, but shall do so by reversing Titus' conviction.
This is our way of teaching people like Flavius to behave,
and incidentally of securing respect for the Constitution.
Our way of upholding the Constitution is not to strike at
the man who breaks it, but to let off somebody else who
broke something else.
However, it is submitted that Professor Wigmore has taken an
erroneous view of the actualities of the problem. Titus does not
go free, but must face a new trial. And Flavius, if Congress or the
legislature so wishes to provide, faces a penalty for his wrongful
action. And, what is more important, Titus will not be deprived of
his liberty by methods which "smell of the Star Chamber," but
only by methods consonant with the traditional concepts of
fair play as embodied in the "due process" concept.
The conclusion of Justice Douglas in the Rea case is that the
policy designed to protect the privacy of the citizen "is defeated if
the federal agent can flaunt . . . (the Rules) and use the fruits of
his unlawful act either in federal or state proceedings."
21 148 F. 2d 696 (Fifth Cir. 1945).
22 40 S. Ct. 182, 251 U. S. 385, 64 L. Ed. 319 (1920).
23 8 Wigmore on Evidence, s 2184 (Third Ed. 1940).
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It is submitted that the Rea case is correct in answering in the
affirmative the underlying policy inquiry, namely, whether one
who may be guilty of a crime should be allowed to go free when the
proof of his alleged guilt has been unlawfully obtained.
In the Rea case, the petitioner moved, as indicated above, under
Rule 41 (e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to suppress
the illegally obtained evidence. The rules read:
A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure
may move the district court ... to suppress for use as evi-
dence anything so unlawfully obtained . . . If the motion is
granted the property... shall not be admissible in evidence
at any hearing or trial.
From the cases have arisen two basic premises: First, the
general rule is that a return or supression of evidence can be or-
dered by a federal court where and only where the property is in
the possession of a federal officer. And secondly, state officers act-
ing under state process cannot be compelled by a federal court to re-
turn articles taken from the prisoner. This latter view is consistent
with the rulings of the Federal Supreme Court refusing to include
the first eight amendments to the Federal Constitution within the
concept of "due process" in the Fourteenth Amendment.
Thus, it appears clear that the Rule can be applied only against
a federal officer. But is the phrase "any hearing" to be similarly
construed to apply only to a federal hearing?
Indicative of the answer is the construction given a similar pro-
vision in the Federal Immunity Act of 1954,24 which provides that
testimony compelled under the act cannot be used "as evidence in
any criminal proceeding... in any court."
In Adams v. State of Maryland,25 and more recently in Ullman
v. United States,26 the provision was construed as binding upon state
as well as federal courts, thus reversing what had been considered
settled law, namely, that neither federal nor state enactments grant-
ing immunity from prosecution were capable of being applied to the
government other than that which enacted it.
Therefore, the conclusion seems inevitable that Rule 41 (e) is
24 18 U. S. C. A. 3486.
25 74 S. Ct. 442, 347 U. S. 179, 98 L. Ed. 608 (1954).
2a76 S. Ct. 497, 350 U. S. 422 (1956).
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susceptible of an interpretation which will bind both federal and
state courts, insofar as the phrase "any hearing or trial" is con-
cerned. The Rea case interpretation is only following where others
have trod before.
PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONALLY APPLYING RULE 41 (E) To FEDERAL
OFFICERS WHEN THE EFFECT IS TO INTERFERE WITH A STATE
PROSECUTION
From an analysis of our federal-state system of government, it
seems to follow that federal courts, as a general rule, have no power
to enjoin actions or proceedings in a state court.
27
Indeed, the Federal Judicial Code expressly prohibits federal
courts from granting writs of injunction to stay proceedings in any
court of a state with but one exception not applicable to this dis-
cussion.
However, the provision does not prevent a Federal court from
enjoining proceedings in state courts which would defeat or im-
pair the jurisdiction of the Federal court.2
-t
With this general background before us, an analysis of the argu-
ment of Justice Douglas in the Rea case indicates that his premise
is correct.
Most persuasive is the language of the Court is Wise v. Henkel,"'
in which it was held that:
.. it was within the power of the court to take juris-
diction of the subject of the return . . .as the result of its
inherent authority to consider and decide questions arising
before it concerning an alleged unreasonable exertion of
authority in connection with the execution of the process of
the court.
Again, the Supreme Court decided in Brown v. Walker,30 that
Congress could constitutionally provide immunity from prosecution
in state courts through its immunity laws.
It is clear that the granting of such immunity by Congress
could have the same effect upon a state action as Rule 41(e) had
in the Rea case.
And in the Ullman case the majority concluded: "Here the
State is forbidden to prosecute. But it cannot be contested that
Congress has power to provide for national defense arid the com-
plementary power "To make all laws ... necessary and proper for
carrying into execution the foregoing powers..."
Therefore, if the Federal government has the power to forbid
a state prosecution, can it reasonably be contended that it has not
the power to exercise jurisdiction over its officials when such will
only incidentally affect the state prosecution?
To answer this question affirmatively, one would have to
ignore the power of Congress "to ordain and establish inferior
27 28 Am Jut 401, Injunctions § 218.
29 Ex porte Young, 28 S. Ct. 441, 209 U. S. 123, 52 L. Ed. 714 (1908).
29 31 S. Ct. 599, 220 U. S. 556, 55 L. Ed 581 (1911).
30 16 S. Ct. 651, 161 U. S. 607, 40 L. Ed. 819 (1896).
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courts,"'3 1 the Constitutional provision extending the judicial power
"to all cases, in law and equity, arising under . . . the laws of the
United States, ' 32 and the all engulfing "necessary and proper"83
clause of the Federal Constitution.
To conclude, it should be noted that Rule 41 (e) was a part of
the body of rules prescribed by the Supreme Court of the United
States and made effective only after submission to and approval by
Congress. Therefore, it seems clear that Congress, the policy-mak-
ing body, has laid down "an intelligible principle" to which the in-
ferior courts in this case are directed to conform. That Congress has
such power seems undeniable.
PROBLEM OF DELEGATION OF POWER
Justice Douglas, in the Rea case, stated that "the power of the
federal courts extends to policing . . . (the Rules) and making cer-
tain that they are observed."
The dissenting opinion latched on to the phrase, which appears
to be extraneous to the decision, and argued that this was the first
time that it had been suggested that the federal courts shared with
the executive branch responsibility for supervising law enforce-
ment agencies as such.
Assuming, arguendo, the validity of the dissenting premise
under consideration, it is nonetheless well settled that "a statute is
not invalid as conferring executive powers where the actual power
of the executive department is not diminished."8
4
Here, it clearly appears that Congress, in enacting Rule 41 (e)
has not diminished in any real sense any powers previously vested
in the executive branch. Indeed, it only seems that quasi-executive
or administrative powers were given to the District Courts in an
incidental capacity, the real powers lying in the authorization to
determine when a search warrant had been improvidently issued,
and decreeing rights flowing from such unlawful action. Both of
these latter powers appear to be judicial, rather than executive, in
nature.
On these bases the conclusion follows that there has been no
real delegation of powers of a type forbidden by our system of gov-
ernment. Rather, there appears only to be an enhancing of the
judicial function, with no resulting loss of powers by any other
branch of the government.
PROBLEM OF ENCROACHMENT ON STATES' RIGHTS
As indicated in the materials above, and as pointed out in the
dissent in the Rea case, the problem of federal-state relationships
is one of the utmost significance. It is felt that this problem, perhaps
more than any other problem in the case, spotlights the myriad dif-
ficulties facing a court in resolving conflicting considerations.
Under the Federal Constitution, it seems clear that "the Na-
tional Government may not, in the exercise of its powers, prevent a
state from discharging its ordinary functions of government. '35 But
31 U. S. Const. Art. III, § 1.
82 U. S. Const. Art. III, § 2.
3
8
U. S. Const. Art. III, § 8, cl. 18.
34 11 Am Jut 888, Constitutional Low, § 189.
35 11 Am Jur 870. Constitutional Low, § 174.
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equally true is it that no state can interfere with the free and un-
embarrassed exercise by the Federal Government of all powers
possessed by it.
Many cases have illustrated the principle that the mere fact a
federal law has an adverse, incidental, effect upon states' rights will
not vitiate it.
Illustrative is Ex parte Siebold,36 in which the United States
Supreme Court held:
The regulations of Congress being constitutionally
paramount, the duties imposed thereby upon the officers of
the United States, so far as they respect the same matters,
must necessarily be paramount to those to be performed by
the officers of the state. If both cannot be performed, the
latter are pro tanto superseded and cease to be duties.
Regarding the effect of the Tenth Amendment, upon which
the dissent in the Rea case appears to be based, it should be noted
at the outset that the Amendment has been gradually limited in
scope and importance by the Supreme Court. And it was finally
reduced to an almost meaningless phrase in United States v. Dar-
by, "7 in which it was held that "the Tenth Amendment . . . (does
not deprive) the national government of authority to resort to all
means for the exercise of a granted power which are appropriate
and plainly adopted to the permitted end."
It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court, in one of its earliest
s6 100 U. S. 371, 25 L. Ed. 717 (1880).
S761 S. Ct. 451, 312 U. S. 100, 85 L. Ed. 608 (1941).
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decisions concerning federal-state sovereignty, namely, the cele-
brated case of McCulloch v. Maryland,38 held that "states have no
power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in
any manner control the operations of the constitutional laws enacted
by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the gen-
eral government."
It is significant to note that the majority opinion in the Stef-
anelli case conceded that "the power to grant the relief (against
a state officer using evidence in a state court obtained in violation
of a federal act) ... may fairly and constitutionally be derived from
the ... act."
,iR 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819).
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Equally significant, we think, is the fact that the Court of Ap-
peals in the Rea case "assumed without deciding" that the court had
the authority under its general equity power to suppress the evi-
dence.
And finally, even the dissent in the Rea case was forced to con-
clude that the "federal courts undeniably have the power to issue
an injunction in this case."
The majority opinion in the Stefanelli case, however, argued
quite persuasively that the granting of the motion to suppress would
disregard the power of courts of equity to exercise discretion "when
the balance is against the wisdom" of using such power.
It argued that:
. . . the considerations governing that discretion touch
perhaps the most sensitive source of friction between States
and Nation, namely, the active intrusion of the federal
courts in the administration of the criminal law for the
prosecution of crimes solely within the power of the States.
Discretionary refusal to exercise equitable power . . . is
one of the devices we have sanctioned for preserving this
balance.
Reference was also made in the Rea dissent to Douglas v. City
of Jeannette,39 in which the Supreme Court of the United States
held that
... courts of equity in the exercise of their discretionary
powers should (refuse) . . . to interfere with or embarass
threatened proceedings in state courts save in those excep-
tional cases which call for the interposition of a court of
equity to prevent irreparable injury which is clear and im-
minent.
It should be noted, this writer believes, that Rule 41 (e) in no
wise indicates that its provisions are to be enforced only in the dis-
cretion of the court. Rather, there is every reason to believe that
Congress, in setting forth the standards contained in the Rule, was
establishing a policy for federal agents, a policy which was to be
carried out by proper judicial action.
Secondly, even if the language of Rule 41 (e) be considered dis-
39 63 S. Ct. 877, 319 U. S. 157, 87 L. Ed. 1324 (1943).
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cretionary, it seems clear that a pending conviction in a state court
for a serious crime is "an irreparable injury which is clear and im-
minent" so as to come within the terms of the rule expressed in the
Douglas case.
That the federal-state relationship is perhaps altered may be
conceded. And that the state has again come away "second best"
in its continuing joust with the Nation may also be conceded. But
that the "authority of the United States government is supreme
in its cognizance of all subjects which the Constitution has com-
mitted to it,"40 is indisputable.
PROBLEM OF EQUITABLE INTERVENTION WHERE
A LEGAL REMEDY Is AVAILABLE
The general rule is that equity acts only where the remedy at
law is inadequate, the "office of equity being to supply defects in
the law."
41
The Supreme Court of the United States has adopted the gen-
eral rule in the expression that "equity jurisdiction will be sustained
unless the remedy at law is complete and will secure to the litigant
the whole right in a manner as just and perfect as that which is
attainable in a court of equity."
'41
Thus, it appears clear that "it is not sufficient, in order to ex-
clude the jurisdiction of equity, that there be a remedy at law; such
a remedy must also be adequate.
' 42
The traditional view has been that the use of illegally seized
evidence would not be enjoined because an "adequate" remedy
existed at law. Typical of the views of most jurisdictions, including
Colorado,43 is the language in Williams v. State: "If the consti-
tuitonal rights of a citizen are invaded.. ., the most that any branch
of government can do is to afford the citizen such redress as is pos-
sible, and bring the wrongdoer to account for his unlawful con-
duct.
44
It should be noted that in the Rea case, the Supreme Court
acted under its equity powers. And, it seems quite possible that
the Court has finally recognized the actualities of the situation,
namely, that affording civil redress for the trespass is not an ade-
quate remedy for one who has been convicted of a crime on the
basis of evidence illegally taken from him.
It is submitted that the Rea case, if it stands for such a proposi-
tion, is in keeping with the best traditions of equity. An adequate
remedy for one who has been deprived of his liberty by means
violative of his constitutional rights is not afforded by allowing him
to slap the hand of the wrongdoer.
4011 Am Jur 40, Equity, § 3.
41 Clemente v. Macheboeuf, 92 U. S. 418, 23 L. Ed. 504 (1875).
42 19 Am Jur 109, Equity § 101. See also Schoenthal v. Irving Trust Co., 53 S. Ct. 50, 287
U. 5. 92, 77 L. Ed. 185(1932); Green River v. Fuller Brush Co., 65 F. 2d. 112 (10th Cir. 1933); and
Denver & S.F.R. Co. v. Englewood, 62 C. 229, 161 P. 151 (1916).
48 People v. Kinnison, 94 C. 350, 30 P. 2d. 249 (1934).
44 100 Ga. 511, 28 S. E. 624 (1897).
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CONCLUSION
Legally, it is believed that the Rea ruling must be confined to
the facts out of which it arose. So confining it, the principal signifi-
cance lies in the restriction it places upon the rule that evidence
illegally seized by federal officers is admissible in a state court,
viz., under a federal court judge, under Rule 41, feels the federal
officer acted unlawfully, even though the seizure "does not shock
the conscience of the court," or in any way violate state constitu-
tional commands.
However, the real significance of the case appears to lie in its
rationale, which quite clearly indicates many revolutionary changes
may be expected regarding the solution to old problems as analyzed
with the new light of the Rea case.
Among the changes which may be expected is the inclusion
within the "due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the prohibitions contained in the Fourth, and probably the eventual
inclusion of the first eight amendments within the concept, there-
by overruling the Wolf and Irvine cases.
Secondly, it seems probable that the federal courts will take
a dim view of the argument that the application of the exclusionary
rule to the states will result in an obstruction of justice, insofar as
it will limit the means which may be used to reach the desired end.
That there are considerations of public policy and a tradition of
180 years of "silent acquiescence" by the federal government is true,
but equally true and more persuasive is it that we appear to be in
a "laissez-faire" era regarding the protection of individual liberties.
Thirdly, the Rea case may indicate an increased activity upon
the part of Congress in enacting legislation, the ultimate effect of
which will result in increased federal powers and decreased state
powers.
Fourthly, increased assertions of equitable jurisdiction by the
federal courts may be seen, in order that an adequate remedy may
be provided according to the actuality of the situation, rather than
according to some theoretical concept having no real basis in fact.
Finally, that the Constitution will continue to receive an in-
creasingly broad interpretation, thereby enhancing the powers of
the three branches of the federal government seems clear. That the
powers of the states will thereby be reduced may be argued, but it
seems that there is little left upon which the government of the
United States can encroach, since, in view of the Darby case, the
states today appear to be merely in the position of "residuary
legatees."
If the securing of personal liberties weakens the powers and
rights of the state, then perhaps the Rea decision constitutes an
encroachment upon states' rights. But it should be pointed out that
the Tenth Amendment also secures to the people those powers not
delegated in the Constitution to the federal government. The Tenth
Amendment being what it is today, we will accept an incidental en-
croachment upon non-existent state rights, in order that a more
perfect individual freedom may be realized!
DICTA
